A General Approach to Welfare Measurement through National Income Accounting by Geir B. Asheim & Wolfgang Buchholz
A GENERAL APPROACH TO WELFARE




CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 831
CATEGORY 8: RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT
DECEMBER 2002
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 831
A GENERAL APPROACH TO WELFARE
MEASUREMENT THROUGH NATIONAL INCOME
ACCOUNTING
Abstract
We develop a framework for analyzing national income accounting using a revealed welfare
approach that is sufficiently general to cover, e.g., both the standard discounted utilitarian and
maximin criteria as special cases. We show that the basic welfare properties of comprehensive
national income accounting, which were previously ascribed only to the discounted utilitarian
case, in fact extend to this more general framework. In particular, it holds under a wide range
of circumstances that real NNP growth (or equivalently, a positive value of net investments)
indicates welfare improvement. We illustrate the applicability of our approach by considering
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Net national product (nnp) represents the maximized value of the ﬂow of goods and
services that are produced by the productive assets of a society. If nnp increases,
then society’s capacity to produce has increased, and—one might think—society is
better oﬀ. Although such an interpretation is often made in public debate, the as-
sertion has been subject to controversy in the economic literature. While Samuelson
(1961, p. 51) writes that “[o]ur rigorous search for a meaningful welfare concept has
led to a rejection of all current income concepts ...”, Weitzman (1976), in his seminal
contribution, shows that greater nnp indicates higher welfare if
(a) dynamic welfare equals the sum of utilities discounted at a constant rate, and
(b) current utility equals the market value of goods and services consumed.
Weitzman’s result is truly remarkable—as it means that changes in the stock
of forward looking welfare can be picked up by changes in the ﬂow of the value
of current production—but, unfortunately, very strong assumptions are invoked.
Recently, Asheim and Weitzman (2001) have established that assumption (b) can
be relaxed when concerned with whether welfare is increasing locally in time: real
nnp growth corresponds to welfare improvement even when current utility does not
equal the market value of current consumption, as long as nnp is deﬂated by a
Divisia consumption price index. It is the purpose of the present paper to show how
also Weitzman’s assumption (a) can be relaxed and a “snapshot” of the change in
society’s current performance still indicates change in dynamic welfare.
Why relax the assumption of discounted utilitarianism? First of all, such an as-
sumption restricts the use of nnp comparisons for indicating welfare changes to situ-
ations where it can readily be determined that society maximizes the sum of utilities
discounted at a constant rate. Moreover, there is a contradiction between having wel-
fare correspond to discounted utilitarianism, on the one hand, and being concerned
with welfare improvement, on the other hand, since increasing welfare over time does
not have independent interest when society implements a path that maximizes the
sum of discounted utilities. E.g., in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model (Dasgupta and
Heal, 1974; Solow, 1974) of capital accumulation and resource depletion, eventually
society’s welfare is optimally decreasing along the discounted utilitarian path.
There are reasons to believe that real-world societies care about whether welfare
is improving, both in terms of what proponents of economic growth may refer to as
2‘progress’ and in terms of what environmentalists call ‘sustainability’. Two (perhaps
hypothetical, but still relevant) explicit examples may serve as illustrations:
² Would we wish to follow a discounted utilitarian path if along this path people
become worse oﬀ, even though sustained progress is feasible?
² And would we wish to follow a discounted utilitarian path if the emissions of
greenhouse gases along this path in the next decades would seriously undermine
the livelihood for most people 2–3 centuries from now?
This raises the question: Is it possible to use the national accounting aggregate
‘real nnp’ as a tool for comparing welfare across time when we leave the framework
of discounted utilitarianism, and instead consider social preferences and resource
allocation mechanisms for which welfare improvement has independent interest?
Within a wider class of situations it becomes more interesting to measure welfare
changes, because such measurement might then yield information that is useful for
the management of society’s assets. If society, e.g., seeks to maximize the sum
of discounted utilities within the subset of sustainable paths, does the observation
that the growth rate of real nnp decreases towards zero indicate that unconstrained
development is no longer sustainable?
Here we develop a framework for national accounting that is suﬃciently general
to incorporate such concerns. In particular, it is suﬃciently general to include, in
addition to discounted utilitarianism, also cases like
² maximin,
² undiscounted utilitarianism, and
² discounted utilitarianism with a sustainability constraint.
Thereby, we extend Weitzman’s (1976) remarkable result—namely, that a “snap-
shot” of the change in society’s current performance as measured by the change in
real nnp indicates change in dynamic welfare, a result that was previously ascribed
only to the discounted utilitarian case—to a far more general framework.
Our analysis will be based on the assumptions that society implements an eﬃ-
cient path that does not waste opportunity for welfare improvement. On this basis
we will demonstrate how the underlying—but unspeciﬁed and unobservable—welfare
judgements is revealed by current nnp, which in turn depends on the current prices
and quantities that the implemented policies lead to in a perfect market economy.
3It is a prerequisite for the positive results—from Weitzman (1976) to the cur-
rent paper—that the list of goods and services included in nnp is comprehensive.
The national accounts are ‘comprehensive’ if all variable determinants of current
productive capacity are included in the vector of capital stocks, and if all vari-
able determinants of current well-being are included in the vector of consumption
ﬂows. E.g., compared to nnp as normally measured, one must “green” the national
accounts by introducing natural resource depletion and environmental degradation
into the national accounts by (i) including such depletion and degradation of natural
capital as negative components to the vector of investment goods, and (ii) adding
ﬂows of environmental amenities to the vector of consumption goods.
These ﬁndings from national income accounting correspond to the result that the
value of net investments has the following welfare signiﬁcance under discounted utili-
tarianism: Welfare is increasing if and only if the value of net investments is positive.
Thus, in an economy with natural capital, welfare is increasing if and only if the ac-
cumulation of manmade capital (including stocks of knowledge) in value more than
compensates for natural resource depletion and environmental degradation. This is
already proven by Weitzman (1976, eq. (14)) under the assumption of discounted
utilitarianism, although the result is not emphasized by him. It has been reported
in several contributions, including Hamilton and Clemens (1999), Pemberton and
Ulph (2001), and, in a diﬀerent setting, Dasgupta and M¨ aler (2000).
Here we ﬁrst show that this result holds even outside the realm of discounted
utilitarianism, before using the analysis of Asheim and Weitzman (2001) to establish
that a positive value of net investments correspond to real nnp growth. Hence, it
holds under quite general assumptions that welfare improvement can be indicated
in two ways; either by increasing real nnp, or by the value of consumption falling
short of nnp so that the value of net investments is positive.
We present the basic model in Sect. 2, before we in Sect. 3 take a look at national
income accounting in the special cases of discounted utilitarianism and maximin.
Then we turn in Sect. 4 to our general framework for revealed welfare analysis,
and show in the following Sect. 5 how this framework means that real nnp growth
can indicate welfare improvement in a general setting. Finally, we illustrate the
applicability of our framework in Sect. 6 by considering progress and sustainability
in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model, and conclude in Sect. 7.
42 The model
Our analysis is performed within the technological environment used by Asheim and
Weitzman (2001), who generalize Weitzman (1976) by allowing multiple consump-
tion goods.
Let the vector C represent a m-dimensional fully-disaggregated consumption
bundle, containing all variable determinants of current instantaneous well-being,
including environmental amenities and other externalities. (Supplied labor corre-
sponds to negative components.) Current consumption is presumed to be fully
observable, along with its associated m-vector of eﬃciency prices.
Let U be a given concave and non-decreasing utility function with continuous
partial derivatives that assigns instantaneous utility U(C) to any consumption vector
C. The preferences over C at time t are thus separable from the quantities consumed
at other times, which is a standard assumption in growth theory. Since all non-
constant ﬂows of consumption services are included in C, the U-function allows
comparisons across time. Thus, the society’s instantaneous well-being is increased
by moving from C0 to C00 if and only if U(C0) < U(C00), which is again a standard
assumption.
There are n capital goods, including not only the usual kinds of man-made capital
stocks, but also stocks of natural resources, environmental assets, human capital (like
education and knowledge capital accumulated from R&D-like activities), and other
durable productive assets. The stock of capital of type j at time t is denoted Kj(t),
and its corresponding net investment ﬂow is Ij(t) = ˙ Kj(t). The n-vector K = (Kj)
denotes all capital stocks, while I = (Ij) stands for the corresponding n-vector of
net investments. The net investment ﬂow of a natural capital asset is negative if the
overall extraction rate exceeds the replacement rate.
Assume that the coverage of capital goods is so comprehensive, and the national
accounting system so complete, that all variable determinants of current productive
capacity are included in the vector of capital stocks. Thus, all sources of development
are captured by I, valued at eﬃciency prices, and included in national product.
Formally, the (m + n)–dimensional set of attainable consumption-investment pairs
is a function S only of the available capital stocks K, not of time. Hence, the
consumption-investment pair (C;I) is attainable given K if and only if
(C;I) 2 S(K):
Assume that, for all K, S(K) is a convex and smooth set. By the assumption of
5smoothness we abstract from the issue of non-negativity constraints.
The set of the attainable consumption-investment pairs, S(K), given the current
capital stocks, K, constitutes the current productive capacity. In a perfect market
economy, nnp corresponds to the maximized market value of current productive
capacity. As time passes, nnp changes both because K, and thus productive capacity
S(K), change due to a non-zero vector of net investments, and because the eﬃciency
prices of the consumption and investment vectors change. The question posed in
the introduction and analyzed in this paper is how an increased market value of the
current productive capacity S(K) can be interpreted as welfare improvement.
Since nnp is used for (a) consumption now and (b) accumulation of capital goods
yielding increased future consumption, such an interpretation can be made only if
welfare is dynamic: The welfare judgements must not only take into account the util-
ity derived from current consumption, but must also reﬂect the utility possibilities
that future consumption will give rise to. For this purpose, we assume that society’s
welfare judgements are described by complete and transitive social preferences on
the set of utility paths. However, these underlying social preferences are assumed
not to be directly observable by the national accountant.
What the national accountant can observe at any point in time is how the agents
in society make decisions according to a resource allocation mechanism that assigns
an attainable consumption-investment pair (C(K);I(K)) to any vector of capital
stocks K.1 We assume that the functions C and I are continuous everywhere and
diﬀerentiable almost everywhere, and that there exists a unique solution fK¤(t)g
to the diﬀerential equations ˙ K¤(t) = I(K¤(t)) that satisﬁes the initial condition
K¤(0) = K0, where K0 is given. Hence, fK¤(t)g is the capital path that the resource
allocation mechanism implements. Write C¤(t) := C(K¤(t)) and I¤(t) := I(K¤(t)).
Since the resource allocation mechanism in this manner implements a utility
path fU(C¤(t))g for any vector of initial capital stocks K0, the social preferences
yield a complete and transitive binary relation on the set of capital vectors, under
the presumption that paths are implemented by the resource allocation mechanism.
Assume that, for given social preferences and resource allocation mechanism, there
exists an ordinal welfare index, W, that represents this binary relation. The W
function signiﬁes that society’s dynamic welfare is increased by moving from K0 to
K00 if and only if W(K0) < W(K00). Since W is ordinal, the welfare index is unique
up to a monotone transformation.
1This is inspired by Dasgupta (2001, p. C20) and Dasgupta and M¨ aler (2000).
6Throughout the next sections we will invoke diﬀerentiability assumptions that,
of course, will be satisﬁed in the speciﬁc examples we consider. We do so in order
to present the basic results in a setting that focuses on the welfare interpretation
of national accounting. In the case of W, we make two such assumptions: (i) We
assume that W is continuous everywhere and diﬀerentiable almost everywhere, and
(ii) we assume that the implemented path of capital stocks, fK¤(t)g, does not spend
a positive measure of time at points in K-space at which W is not diﬀerentiable,
except when absorbed at some capital vector K1, so that I¤(t) = I(K1) = 0
and K¤(t) = K1 from then on. Also, to retain focus, we refer to optimal control
theory and the maximum principle throughout the next sections under standard
assumptions, without explicitly stating what these assumption are.
After motivating issues in the next section by discussing the special cases of dis-
counted utilitarianism and maximin, we raise in Sect. 4 the following general ques-
tion: What kind of (invisible) guiding of the resource allocation mechanism by the
(unobservable) social preferences implies that the underlying welfare concerns will be
revealed through national income accounting?
3 Discounted utilitarianism and maximin
A main motivation for the analysis of the present paper is that it applies to a variety
of methods for aggregating the interests of diﬀerent generations in social evaluation.
Discounted utilitarianism is the conventional example of social preferences in the
intertemporal context. A prime example of an alternative welfare criterion is max-
imin—i.e., the ranking of paths according to the utility of the worst-oﬀ generation—
as proposed by Rawls (1971) and Solow (1974). As these are two important and
often applied kinds of social preferences, we ﬁrst seek to determine properties that
hold for resource allocation mechanisms that implement discounted utilitarianism
and maximin. This will in turn point to properties that will ensure welfare signiﬁ-
cance for national income accounting also in the case of maximin as well as a wider
set of social preferences and resource allocation mechanisms.
It seems natural to identify the value of the welfare index, W(K), with the
utility level that if held constant is equally as good as the implemented utility path
given K as the vector of initial stocks. This corresponds to a standard constructive
technique for preference representation in consumer theory (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et
al., 1995, pp. 47–8, and Varian, 1992, p. 97), and is inspired by Hicks (1946, ch. 14)
7and Weitzman (1976) in the present context. As shown below, W(K) can be deﬁned
as such a stationary equivalent of future utility in the special cases of discounted
utilitarianism and maximin.
Discounted utilitarianism. In the case of discounted utilitarianism, social pref-
erences are represented by Z 1
0
e¡½tU(C(t))dt; (1)
where ½ is a positive and constant utility discount rate. Assume that the resource
allocation mechanism, for any vector of initial capital stocks K0, implements a path
fC¤(t);I¤(t);K¤(t)g that maximizes (1) over all feasible consumption paths. By
the maximum principle there exists a path fΨ(t)g of investment prices in terms of
utility such that (C¤(t);I¤(t)) maximizes U(C)+Ψ(t)I subject to (C;I) 2 S(K¤(t))
at each t. Associate welfare W(K0) with the utility level that if held constant is










It is the main result of Weitzman (1976) that




Hence, W(K0) = U(C¤(0)) + Ψ(0)I¤(0) under discounted utilitarianism.
Since Ψ(0) is the vector of partial derivatives of
R 1
0 e¡½tU(C¤(t))dt w.r.t. the
initial stocks, we obtain that the vector of partial derivatives of W, rW(K0), equals
½Ψ(0). By the maximum principle it now follows that
(C¤(0);I¤(0)) maximizes ½U(C) + rW(K0)I subject to (C;I) 2 S(K0);




and ½ > 0.
Maximin. In the case of maximin, social preferences are represented by
inft U(C(t)):
Assume that the resource allocation mechanism implements maximin and results
in an eﬃcient path with constant utility; formally, what Burmeister and Hammond
(1977) and Dixit et al. (1980) call a regular maximin path. Then with K¤(0) = K0
8as the initial condition there exists a path of utility discount factors f¹(t)g such that




over all feasible consumption paths. Since U(C¤(t)) is constant, it follows that
R 1
0 ¹(t)dt is ﬁnite. This requirement is satisﬁed if the supporting utility discount
rates, ¡˙ ¹(t)=¹(t), are positive and do not decrease too fast. Again, by the maximum
principle there exists a path fΨ(t)g of investment prices in terms of utility such that
(C¤(t);I¤(t)) maximizes U(C) + Ψ(t)I subject to (C;I) 2 S(K¤(t)) at each t.
Associate welfare W(K0) also in this case with the utility level that if held
constant is equally as good as the implemented path. It follows trivially that the
constant utility level is a welfare index along a regular maximin path:






By the converse of Hartwick’s rule (cf. Dixit et al., 1980; Hartwick, 1977; Witha-
gen and Asheim, 1998), we have that Ψ(t)I¤(t) = 0 at each t. Hence, W(K0) =
U(C¤(0)) + Ψ(0)I¤(0) even under maximin.





w.r.t. the initial stocks, we obtain by invoking the envelope theorem that
rW(K0) = ½¤Ψ(0) with ½¤ :=
¹(0) R 1
0 ¹(t)dt ;
where ½¤ is the inﬁnitely long-term supporting utility discount rate at time 0, which
equals the discounted average of the (instantaneous) utility discount rate ¡˙ ¹(t)=¹(t)
from time 0 on. Note that W is diﬀerentiable everywhere also in the case of maximin.
By the maximum principle it follows that
(C¤(0);I¤(0)) maximizes ½¤U(C) + rW(K0)I subject to (C;I) 2 S(K0);




and ½¤ > 0.2
2We are actually oﬀering a simple proof of the converse of Hartwick’s rule through the observation
that rW(K
¤(t)) is proportional to Ψ




¤(t), which due to proportionality of rW(K
¤(t)) and Ψ(t) yields Ψ(t)I
¤(t) = 0. Cairns
(2000) makes a similar observation.
9Thus, the cases of discounted utilitarianism and maximin allow us to make the
following two observations:
1. By referring to U(C¤(0))+Ψ(0)I¤(0) as net national product in terms of utility
(or “utility nnp”), we get in both cases that utility nnp is a global represen-
tation of dynamic welfare, in the sense that welfare is greater if and only if
utility nnp is greater.
2. By interpreting ½ (resp. ½¤) as a Lagrangian multiplier associated with the
constraint that U(C) ¸ U(C¤(0)), we get in both cases that welfare improve-
ment at time 0, rW(K0)I, is maximized subject to (a) (C;I) being attainable,
and (b) utility at time 0 being at least U(C¤(0)).
The analysis of this paper will show how property 2 can be used as the basis for
revealed welfare analysis under a wider set of circumstances. Furthermore, it yields
welfare signiﬁcance to national accounting aggregates that are measurable in terms
of market prices (within our idealized setting).
In contrast, we show that property 1 cannot be generalized; it does for example
not apply to the case of undiscounted utilitarianism (cf. Sect. 6.1). In any case,
utility nnp is not per se a measurable national accounting aggregate, unless utility
is directly measurable by means of market prices.
We now turn to the general analysis.
4 Resource allocation and welfare improvement
Fix the underlying, but unobservable, social preferences used to rank utility paths,
and consider a resource allocation mechanism. What assumptions on the resource
allocation mechanism are both (i) strong enough for the underlying welfare concerns
to be revealed through national accounting and (ii) weak enough to hold for a wide
range of circumstances? In this section we answer this question by imposing on
the resource allocation mechanism two assumptions that hold if the most preferred
paths under discounted utilitarianism and maximin are implemented. However, as
illustrated in Sect. 6, these assumptions yield results with much wider application.
The ﬁrst of these assumptions is the following.
Assumption 1 (Implementation of an eﬃcient path)Let fC¤(t);I¤(t);K¤(t)g
be the path implemented by the resource allocation mechanism with K¤(0) = K0 as
10initial condition. Then there exists a continuous path of positive supporting utility








over all feasible consumption paths with K¤(0) = K0 as initial condition.
This assumption is clearly satisﬁed when discounted utilitarianism is implemented,
and also for maximin when implementation of this criterion leads to a regular max-
imin path with a supporting path of positive utility discount rates (cf. Sect. 3).
The maximization is as if since
R 1
0 ¹(t)U(C(t))dt is not necessarily the primitive
objective of the society. As illustrated by the maximin case, the path of support-
ing utility discount factors f¹(t)g may simply characterize the implemented path
without having by itself any welfare signiﬁcance.
By the maximum principle there exists a continuous path fΨ(t)g of investment
prices in terms of utility such that, at each t,
(C¤(t);I¤(t)) maximizes U(C) + Ψ(t)I subject to (C;I) 2 S(K¤(t)):
This yields the maximized current-value Hamiltonian:
H¤(t) = H(K¤(t);Ψ(t)) := max
(C;I)2S(K¤(t))
U(C) + Ψ(t)I
= U(C¤(t)) + Ψ(t)I¤(t):
(3)




¹(t)Ψ(t) ¡ ˙ Ψ(t); (4)
where r denotes a vector of partial derivatives, and where ¡˙ ¹(t)=¹(t) is the sup-
porting instantaneous rate of utility discount at time t.
The following basic result—which is at the heart of the analyses of e.g. Weitzman
(1976, cf. eq. (14)) and Dixit et al. (1980, cf. Theorem 1)—can now be established.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, U(C¤(t)) + Ψ(t)I¤(t) is continuous and







holds at almost every t.
11Proof. H¤ = U(C¤) + ΨI¤ is continuous since K¤ and Ψ are continuous. By (3),
(4), and the envelope theorem, it follows that




¹Ψ ¡ ˙ Ψ
¢
I¤ + ˙ ΨI¤ = ¡
˙ ¹
¹ΨI¤ (5)
holds at almost every t. However, (3) also directly implies that
˙ H¤ = rU(C¤) ˙ C¤ + d(ΨI¤)=dt (6)
The second part of the lemma is obtained by combining (5) and (6).
This result says that change in utility nnp equals the supporting utility discount
rate times the value of net investments.
An additional assumption is needed to ensure that the underlying welfare con-
cerns can be revealed through national accounting. Assume, as in Sect. 2, that the
binary relation over vectors of stocks for given resource allocation mechanism is rep-
resented by a welfare index, W, that is unique up to a monotone transformation.
However, in contrast to the discussion in Sect. 3, W(K) need not be associated with
a stationary equivalent utility level.
Except for the technical assumptions made in Sect. 2, we do not make any
assumptions on how W(K) depends on K. Rather, in addition to Assumption 1, we
only impose that the resource allocation mechanism and the accompanying welfare
index satisfy that welfare improvement is maximized subject to the current utility
level being attainable. This is stated by the following assumption, where ½(K) is
formally a Lagrangian multiplier on the lower bound for utility.
Assumption 2 (No waste of welfare improvement) For almost every K, there
exists ½(K) > 0 such that
(C(K);I(K)) maximizes ½(K)U(C) + rW(K)I subject to (C;I) 2 S(K):
By writing W¤(t) := W(K¤(t)) for the welfare level along the implemented path
fC¤(t);I¤(t);K¤(t)g, so that ˙ W¤(t) = rW(K¤(t))I¤(t), we see how this assumption
entails that welfare improvement is maximized subject to (C;I) being attainable and
utility at t being at least U(C¤(t)). We have observed in Sect. 3 that Assumption 2 is
satisﬁed when discounted utilitarianism and (under regularity conditions) maximin
are implemented; in those cases can ½(K) be interpreted as a utility discount rate.
In all our examples, we show that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed for resource
allocation mechanisms that are optimal in sense that they, for any initial stocks,
12implement paths that are weakly preferred to any feasible path according to the
social preferences. We conjecture that Assumptions 1 and 2 are necessary for optimal
resource allocation if the social preferences and the technological environment satisfy
the following condition: There does not exist an alternative path that, compared
to an optimal path, has higher utility in an initial period, at the end of which the
alternative path is deemed as good as the optimal path.3 The investigation of such
a primitive condition on preferences and technology seems, however, to require a
discrete time framework and, thus, falls outside the scope of the present paper.
Based on our two assumptions we now obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, W¤(t) is continuous and
˙ W¤(t) = ½(K¤(t))Ψ(t)I¤(t)
holds at almost every t at which I¤(t) 6= 0.
Proof. W¤(t) is continuous since W and K¤(t) are continuous. Since U is concave
and S(K) is convex and smooth, it follows that there is a unique n–dimensional
hyperplane that supports the set of feasible (n + 1)–dimensional utility-investment
vectors. By comparing the maximum principle with Assumption 2, this implies that
rW(K¤(t)) = ½(K¤(t))Ψ(t)
holds at every t at which W(K¤(t)) is diﬀerentiable. Hence, if fK¤(t)g does not
spend a positive measure of time at points in K-space at which W is not diﬀeren-
tiable, then we obtain that ˙ W¤ = rW(K¤)I¤ = ½(K¤)ΨI¤ holds at almost every t.
Otherwise, by assumption, fK¤(t)g has been absorbed at some capital vector K1,
so that I¤(t) = 0 from then on.
3In the case of maximin, this condition holds if maximin paths are regular, while it can fail
otherwise, e.g., in a one-sector model with the initial capital stock exceeding the golden rule level.
The maximin criterion illustrates that Assumption 2 does not necessarily mean that there is a
linear trade-oﬀ between current utility and welfare improvement. Rather, it is suﬃcient that there is
an n–dimensional hyperplane that separates the set of feasible (n+1)–dimensional utility-investment
vectors from the set of vectors that are socially more preferable.
Assumptions 1 and 2 can hold even if the resource allocation mechanism does not implement an
optimal path. E.g., suppose that society adheres to discounted utilitarianism in a technology where
implementation of discounted utilitarianism would have lead to non-constant utility, but, in fact, a
regular maximin path is implemented. Then, since the utility level that if held constant is equally
as good as the implemented path is equal to the actual utility level, the welfare index is identical
to the one arising if society had adhered to maximin and implemented an optimal path.
13Lemma 2 shows that the sign of the value of net investments along the implemented
path indicates whether welfare is increasing, since the case not covered by the lemma,
I¤(t) = 0, trivially implies ˙ W¤(t) = 0.
The main result of the present section follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, dynamic welfare is increasing if and
only if there is growth in U(C¤(t)) + Ψ(t)I¤(t).
This result means that dynamic welfare is increasing if and only if utility nnp is
increasing. Thus, changes in dynamic welfare according to the unspeciﬁed ag-
gregation of the interests of diﬀerent generations are revealed through changes in
U(C¤(t)) + Ψ(t)I¤(t).
Lemmas 1 and 2 shed light on the problems associated with using utility nnp as
a global welfare index, so that
W(K¤(t)) = U(C¤(t)) + Ψ(t)I¤(t)
holds at each t. Since






¹ΨI¤ (by Lemma 1),
the combination of ½(K¤) 6= ¡˙ ¹=¹ and ΨI¤ 6= 0 implies that utility nnp cannot serve
as a global representation of welfare. As shown in Sect. 3, it works for discounted
utilitarianism because ½(K¤) = ¡
˙ ¹
¹, and it works for maximin because ΨI¤ = 0.
However, in general we must allow for cases where ½(K¤) 6= ¡˙ ¹=¹ is combined with
ΨI¤ 6= 0 and, thus, W(K¤) = U(C¤) + ΨI¤ cannot hold at each t. Hence, it is not
a general result that dynamic welfare can be represented by utility nnp. Rather,
Prop. 1 shows that, along the implemented path, changes in utility nnp qualitatively
measure changes in welfare.
In Sect. 6 we provide two additional examples of resource allocations mecha-
nisms, by describing in the context of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of capital
accumulation and resource depletion (i) a society with a preference for progress and
(ii) a society with a sustainability constraint. In the former case, welfare can not
be represented by utility nnp; market prices can still measure welfare improvement
locally in time. In the latter case, measurement of welfare improvement through
market prices is useful for asset management. First, however, we show how to trans-
late Prop. 1 into the positive result that growth in real nnp measured in market
prices indicates local-in-time welfare improvement.
145 Real NNP growth and local comparisons
Until now we have considered nnp and the value of net investments in utility terms.
Utility, however, is not measurable directly, while market prices are. Comprehen-
sive nnp that is measurable by market prices is frequently identiﬁed in the literature
with the “linearized” Hamiltonian (cf. Hartwick, 1990), being the sum of the value of
consumption and the value of net investments, measured in monetary units. Adapt-
ing Lemma 2 to this empirically more relevant aggregate implies that welfare is
increasing if and only if measurable nnp exceeds the value of consumption.
This is, however a diﬀerent kind of welfare signiﬁcance than the one sought by
Weitzman (1976), where higher welfare is indicated by greater nnp. The latter
interpretation would translate here into a result that welfare is increasing along the
time axis if and only if measurable nnp is also increasing. To demonstrate this,
we show now that the analysis of Asheim and Weitzman (2001) can be adapted to
the present more general setting. We are—like Asheim and Weitzman (2001)—only
concerned with local-in-time comparisons along the implemented path.
When the path implemented by the resource allocation mechanism is realized
through an intertemporal competitive equilibrium, market prices will be expressed
in monetary units. Neither the vector of marginal utilities, rU(C¤), nor the vector
of investment prices in utility units, Ψ, are directly observable. Rather, what may be
observed directly are nominal prices at time t for consumption goods and investment
ﬂows, given respectively by
p(t) = rU(C¤(t))=¸(t)
q(t) = Ψ(t)=¸(t);






where ¸(t) > 0 is the not-directly-observable marginal utility of current expendi-
tures, which may depend on the “quantity of money” at time t. Assume that ¸(t)
is continuous.
Deﬁne comprehensive nnp in nominal prices, y(t), as the sum of the nominal
value of consumption and the nominal value of net investments:
y(t) := p(t)C¤(t) + q(t)I¤(t):
15Under Assumption 1 it follows from the convexity of S and the maximum principle
that the consumption-investment pair maximizes the value of current production at




Furthermore, if f(C;I;K)j(C;I) 2 S(K)g is a convex set, then Assumption 1 implies
that the implemented path corresponds to an intertemporal competitive equilibrium
since, to the given prices, consumers maximize utility and producers maximize proﬁt:
C¤(t) maximizes U(C) ¡ ¸(t)p(t)C; (7)
(C¤(t);I¤(t);K¤(t)) maximizes p(t)C + q(t)I ¡ (r(t)q(t) ¡ ˙ q(t))K
over all (C;I;K) satisfying (C;I) 2 S(K);
(8)
where r(t)qj(t) ¡ ˙ qj(t) is the nominal cost of holding one unit of capital good j.
Here, (7) follows from the concavity of U, while (8) uses the property that rKH =
(¡˙ ¹=¹)Ψ¡ ˙ Ψ = (¡˙ ¹=¹)¸q¡ ˙ ¸q¡¸˙ q = ¸(rq¡ ˙ q). This latter property also means
that Lemma 1, expressed in nominal prices, yields
p(t) ˙ C¤(t) + d(q(t)I¤(t))=dt = r(t)q(t)I¤(t): (9)
It follows from Lemma 2 that dynamic welfare is increasing if and only if nnp
in nominal prices exceeds the value of consumption:
˙ W¤(t) > 0 , y(t) ¡ p(t)C¤(t) = q(t)I¤(t) > 0:
However, since the level of nnp in nominal prices at t depends on ¸(t), and ¸(t) is
arbitrary, the condition that ˙ y(t) > 0 need not signify welfare improvement. For a
change in nnp (as opposed to a comparison of nnp with the value of consumption)
to indicate a change in welfare, nnp must be measured in real prices. How then
should nnp in real prices be determined?
To show how real nnp growth indicates welfare improvement, Asheim and Weitz-
man (2001) build upon a ﬁnding by Sefton and Weale (2000), namely that a Divisia
consumption price index is of essential importance when expressing comprehensive
nnp in real prices. The application of a price index f¼(t)g turns nominal prices
fp(t);q(t)g into real prices fP(t);Q(t)g,
P(t) = p(t)=¼(t)
Q(t) = q(t)=¼(t);
16implying that the real interest rate, R(t), at time t is given by
R(t) = r(t) ¡
˙ ¼(t)
¼(t) :















¼ ˙ pC¤ ¡ ˙ ¼pC¤
¼2 = 0:
Deﬁne comprehensive nnp in real Divisia prices, Y (t), as the sum of the real
value of consumption and the real value of net investments:
Y (t) := P(t)C¤(t) + Q(t)I¤(t):
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, Y (t) is continuous and
˙ Y (t) = R(t)
¡
Y (t) ¡ P(t)C¤(t)
¢
holds at almost every t.
Proof. That Y is continuous follows from the continuity of U(C¤)+ΨI¤ (cf. Lemma
1) since U has continuous partial derivatives and both ¸ and ¼ are continuous.
Furthermore, it follows from the deﬁnition of Y that
˙ Y = d(PC¤ + QI¤)=dt = P ˙ C¤ + d(QI¤)=dt = RQI¤ = R(Y ¡ PC¤) ;
where the second equality follows since ˙ PC¤ = 0, and the third equality is obtained
since (9) holds also for fP(t);Q(t)g and fR(t)g.
Lemma 3 entails that
change in real nnp = real interest rate ¢ value of net investments.
Since, by Lemma 2, a positive value of net investments indicates welfare improve-
ment, we obtain the main result of Asheim and Weitzman (2001) in the current
generalized setting.
Proposition 2 Provided that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed and the real inter-
est rate is positive, dynamic welfare is increasing if and only if there is growth in
measurable nnp in real Divisia prices.
17Proof. The result follow from Lemmas 2 and 3 since
½(K¤)ΨI¤ = ½(K¤)¸¼QI¤ = ½(K¤)¸¼Q(Y ¡ PC¤) ;
with ½(K¤), ¸, and ¼ all positive, if I¤ 6= 0, and ˙ W¤ = 0 = ˙ Y otherwise.
As noted by Asheim and Weitzman (2001), real nnp growth indicates welfare im-
provements locally in time. Unless real nnp grows in a monotone manner between
t0 and t00, it does not necessarily follow that a higher real nnp at t00 than t0 indicates
that welfare is higher at t00 compared to t0.
6 Progress and sustainability in a resource model
We ﬁnally use the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow (DHS) model (cf. Dasgupta and Heal, 1974,
1979; Solow, 1974) of capital accumulation and resource depletion to illustrate the
applicability of our framework.
In Sect. 6.1 we start with an exogenous investment rule that, when combined
with eﬃciency (Assumption 1), leads to progress. We then apply our revealed wel-
fare analysis (by invoking Assumption 2) and show how real nnp growth picks up
that consumption increases in a sustainable manner. We conﬁrm this welfare result
by establishing that the investment rule is optimal under undiscounted utilitarian-
ism. We note that—even though growth in measurable real nnp measures welfare
improvement locally in time—utility nnp cannot be a global welfare indicator.
In Sect. 6.2 we consider a society maximizing the sum of discounted utilities
within the subset of sustainable paths. We conﬁrm that Assumptions 1 and 2
are satisﬁed and show how measurement of welfare improvement through real nnp
growth can be useful for the management of society’s assets: Real nnp growth
approaching zero indicates that unconstrained development is no longer sustainable.
In the DHS model, a stock of man-made capital (KM) is combined with ex-
tracted raw material from a stock of a natural resource (KN) to produce output
that can be split between consumption and investment. For tractability, we assume
that the production function is Cobb-Douglas and exhibits CRS, implying that the
consumption-investment pair (C;IM;IN) is attainable given (KM;KN) if and only if
C + IM · Ka
M ¢ (¡IN)b ; b < a < a + b = 1;
C ¸ 0; IN · 0; KM ¸ 0; KN ¸ 0:
18The assumption that b < a is required to ensure that progress and sustainability are
feasible in the present setting.
Consider paths for which C, ¡IN, KM, and KN remain positive throughout so
that smoothness of the attainable set is satisﬁed. Let the ratio between man-made









If the implemented path satisﬁes Assumption 1, then the real interest rate along the





where ·¤(t) is the capital-output ratio along the implemented path at time t. More-
over, the real investment prices are given by
QM(t) = 1 (10)
QN(t) = b ¢ ·¤(t)
a
b ; (11)
since, with output as numeraire, QN(t) measures the marginal productivity of ¡IN.
The Hotelling rule for short-run eﬃciency yields ˙ QN(t)=QN(t) = R(t), implying
˙ ·¤(t) = b: (12)












N(t) = 0; (14)
then routine calculations show that, by setting U(C) = C, Assumption 1 is satisﬁed:










¢C(t)dt over all feasible paths,




Consider ﬁrst a resource allocation mechanism determined by eﬃciency conditions
(12)–(14) and by the property that investment in man-made capital equals a fraction




M(¡IN)b equals resource rents; i.e., the share of output that is at-
tributable to extraction of raw material. We know from Hartwick’s rule (cf. Hartwick,
1977; Dixit et al., 1980) that reinvesting resource rents forever leads to constant
consumption. We assume b < ¯ < a; ¯ > b means that more than resource rents
are reinvested by following (15), implying that such an investment policy leads to
progress in the sense that consumption increases in a sustained manner, while ¯ < a
is needed to ensure feasibility of the implemented path. We show next how the gen-
eral approach developed in Sect. 4 and 5 can be applied to such “progress paths”.
The resource allocation mechanism determines consumption, accumulation of
man-made capital, and extraction of the natural resource stock as functions of the
pair of capital stocks (KM;KN) that society has at its disposal. It follows from
the deﬁnition of · and the investment rule (15) that these functions can, for any
(KM;KN) À 0, be described by




















where, by imposing the eﬃciency conditions (12) and (14), we can calculate the











and check that (13) is satisﬁed. For given initial stocks (K0
M;K0
N) at time 0, equa-
tions (17)–(19) determine the implemented path of capital stocks, fK¤
M(t);K¤
N(t)g,










N(t)). By combining (16) and (17) with (12), we can establish that consumption







Moreover, by combining (10) and (11) with (19), it follows that the relative price of
natural capital in terms of man-made capital is positively related to ¯, the parameter












By assuming that the implemented path does not waste opportunity for welfare
improvement—i.e., by adding Assumption 2—it follows from Prop. 2 that welfare is
increasing if and only if there is real nnp growth, where real nnp can be written as
C¤(t) + QM(t)I¤
M(t) + QN(t)I¤




due to the constant factor shares. It follows from (12) and (17) that the growth
rate of nnp equals that of consumption. Thus, the revealed welfare analysis picks
up that consumption increases in a sustained manner.
By Lemma 3 increased welfare can also be indicated by a positive value of net
investments: QM(t)I¤
M(t) + QN(t)I¤





















since ¯ > b.































with ˙ KM = IM > 0 and ˙ KN = IN < 0. That welfare is improving along the imple-
mented path can now alternatively be seen by comparing the iso-welfare contours
21given by (23) with the contour that describes the implemented path in (KM;KN)–
space.
This discussion raises the following question: Are there social preferences such
this resource allocation mechanism for any vector of initial stocks implements a
most preferred path? This is answered by observing that the resource allocation







over all feasible paths. It follows from the analysis of Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp.







which implies b < ¯ < a. This, of course, is the assumption we have imposed.
By considering the maximum value of the integral in (24) with (KM;KN) À 0
as initial stocks, we ﬁnd that welfare can be represented by (23). This conﬁrms the
result that we have already derived through our revealed welfare analysis, namely
that welfare is increasing along the implemented path.
Under discounted utilitarianism utility nnp is a global representation of dynamic
welfare. This follows from equation (2) in Sect. 3, which is Weitzman’s (1976) main
result. Moreover, under maximin, the converse of Hartwick’s rule implies that utility
nnp is equal to the constant utility level and therefore a global welfare index. For
the progress paths that we analyze here in the context of the DHS model, however,
such a result is not obtained. Rather, it turns out that utility nnp cannot be a
global welfare index.
Proposition 3 Consider the resource allocation determined by (16)–(18) in the
context of the DHS model. There exists no utility function such that net national
product in terms of utility is a global representation of welfare.
Proof. It follows from (15) and the constant factor shares that QM(t)I¤
M(t) +
QN(t)I¤
N(t) = (¯ ¡ b)C¤(t)=(1 ¡ ¯). Since ΨM(t) = U0(C¤(t)) ¢ QM(t) and ΨN(t) =
U0(C¤(t)) ¢ QN(t), this implies




22for an arbitrary U function, when the pair of capital stocks is (KM;KN). Assume
that utility nnp is a global welfare index. Then utility nnp must be invariant when

















Since C(KM;KN) increases when moving along an iso-welfare contour by increasing




+ U00(C)C = 0





Since the implemented path maximizes (24), the supporting utility discount rate is
zero throughout for any utility function in this class. Under these circumstances,
Lemma 1—extrapolated to the case with a zero utility discount rate—implies that
utility nnp does not change as a consequence of non-zero value of net investments.
Indeed, it follows that utility nnp is zero for any pair of initial stocks if the utility
function is given by (25). Hence, utility nnp has no welfare signiﬁcance within the
class of utility functions that are aﬃne transformations of (25).
Assumption 1 is not satisﬁed for any utility function in the class considered in
the proof of Prop. 3, i.e. that is an aﬃne transformation of (25). If we instead use
a utility function so that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed for a path of supporting utility
discount factors f¹(t)g with discount rates ¡˙ ¹(t)=¹(t) that are positive (U(C) = C









see Sefton and Weale (1996). This implies that utility nnp is a weighted average
of future utility. However, by following a given iso-welfare contour deﬁned by (23)
as KM ! 1 and KN ! 0, and considering the consumption paths that would
be implemented for these initial conditions, it can be shown that the minimal con-
sumption (which occurs at time 0) along these paths goes to inﬁnity. This means
that the constant welfare along such an iso-welfare contour cannot be expressed as
a weighted average of future utility.
23However, even though utility nnp cannot serve as a global representation of
dynamic welfare, it is a consequence of the analysis of this paper (cf. Prop. 2) that
growth in measurable nnp in real prices measures welfare improvement locally in
time, even in the current setting. This illustrates the generality of the positive result
that we report in Prop. 2.
6.2 Sustainability as a constraint
Consider now a society that deems unsustainable development unacceptable, and
which adopts a resource allocation mechanism that among the acceptable sustainable




where ½ is a positive and constant utility discount rate.4 We will demonstrate within
this setting that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed, so that our revealed welfare
analysis applies. We will also show how information on the growth rate of real nnp
(or equivalently, the value of net investments) can be useful for asset management
by indicating when unconstrained development is no longer sustainable.
A consumption path is said to be sustainable if, at any time, current consump-
tion does not exceed the maximum sustainable consumption level given the current
capital stocks. Since unconstrained maximization of the sum of discounted utilities
in the DHS model leads to consumption converging to zero as time goes to inﬁnity,
the sustainability constraint imposed on the implemented path is binding. Since
by (12) the real interest rate R(t) = a=·¤(t) is decreasing along any eﬃcient path,
the sustainability constraint binds in an eventual phase with constant consumption,
which can possibly be preceded by an unconstrained utilitarian phase with increas-
ing consumption. For given initial stocks (K0
M;K0





N(t)g can be determined by maximizing (26) subject
to the constraint that consumption is non-decreasing; it follows from standard ar-
guments that such a path exists.
Therefore, if, in this example, social preferences over paths are represented by
(26) on the set of non-decreasing consumption paths, while paths that are not non-
decreasing are strictly less preferred, then it follows that the resource allocation
4Asheim et al. (2001) present ethical axioms under which only sustainable paths are acceptable
in the DHS model. Discounted utilitarian paths under a sustainability constraint in the DHS model
are analyzed in continuous time by Asheim (1986) and Pezzey (1994).
24mechanism implements a most preferred path also in this case. Since implemented
paths are non-decreasing, welfare W(K0
M;K0
N) can be associated with the utility












To facilitate description of the resource allocation mechanism, assume that U has
constant elasticity of marginal utility; i.e., for all C > 0, ¡(U00(C) ¢ C)=U0(C) = ´ >
0. Then the resource allocation mechanism becomes homogenous of degree 1 since
the production function exhibits CRS. In particular, the capital-output ratio · is a
function of KM=KN, and the dividing line between the sustainability unconstrained
and constrained regimes is a ray in (KM;KN)–space. Consumption is increasing
if and only if the rate of return on an investment of current output yielding a
constant and perpetual increase in future consumption is greater than ½. This rate
of return is the inﬁnitely long-term real interest rate, being the inverse of the value
of a perpetual bond. It equals the discounted average of the (instantaneous) real























Note that the inﬁnitely long-term interest rate (a ¡ b)=·¤(t) is smaller than the
instantaneous rate a=·¤(t) since the latter is decreasing throughout.
In the eventual sustainability constrained phase, the resource allocation mech-
anism implements eﬃcient paths with constant consumption. Hence, in this phase
the resource allocation mechanism is described by (16)–(19) with ¯ = b. Since this
phase is entered when the the inﬁnitely long-term interest rate (a ¡ b)=·¤(t) equals
½, it follows from (19) that paths are in the unconstrained discounted utilitarian














Assume for tractability that U(C) = Cb so that ´ = a. Then the unconstrained
discounted utilitarian phase is characterized by (16)–(18) with
¯ = ¯(·) = 1 ¡ a
½·

















is an increasing function of KM=KN since ˙ KM = IM > 0 and ˙ KN = IN < 0 and
continuous at KM=KN = ½((a ¡ b)=½)1=b since ·¤(t) is diﬀerentiable w.r.t. time.
Note that ¯ is a decreasing function of · (and by (12) of time) and converges to b
as · approaches the value (a ¡ b)=½ at which time paths enter into the sustainabil-
ity constrained phase. Hence, output, C, IM, and IN are throughout continuous
functions of (KM;KN) and, thus, of time.
Fix the initial stocks (K0
M;K0
N) À 0 and consider the implemented path deter-
mined by the resource allocation mechanism described above. Let ¿ denote the time
at which the implemented path enters the eventual sustainability constrained phase.
Set ¿ = 0 if the path starts in this phase, i.e., if K0
M=K0
N ¸ ½((a¡b)=½)1=b. We now
verify that this path does indeed satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2 and maximize (26)
subject to consumption being non-decreasing.
Assumption 1 is satisﬁed for the continuous path of supporting utility discount
factors f¹(t)g determined (up to the choice of numeraire) by
¹(t) R 1
t ¹(s)ds = ½ for t 2 [0;¿)
¹(t) R 1
t ¹(s)ds = a¡b
·¤(t) for t 2 [¿;1);
(27)
implying that utility discount rates are positive: ¡˙ ¹(t)=¹(t) = ½ for t 2 (0;¿)
and ¡˙ ¹(t)=¹(t) = a=·¤(t) for t 2 (¿;1). This can be seen by choosing a path
of investment prices in terms of utility fΨM(t);ΨN(t)g so that the current-value
Hamiltonian is maximized at any point in time:
ΨM(t) = U0(C¤(t)) ¢ QM(t) = bC¤(t)¡a
ΨN(t) = U0(C¤(t)) ¢ QN(t) = bC¤(t)¡a ¢ b·¤(t)
a
b :




¹(t)ΨM(t) ¡ ˙ ΨM(t)
0 = ¡
˙ ¹(t)
¹(t)ΨN(t) ¡ ˙ ΨN(t);










26Since ¡˙ ¹(t)=¹(t) jumps from ½ = (a ¡ b)=·¤(¿) to a=·¤(¿) when the sustainability
constrained phase is entered, it follows from (28) that the rate of consumption growth
decreases abruptly from b=(a·¤(¿)) to 0 at that time.
The following result, which is proven in the appendix, establishes formally that
(26) is maximized subject to consumption being non-decreasing.
Lemma 4 For any initial stocks (K0
M;K0
N) À 0, the path implemented by the re-
source allocation mechanism described above maximizes
R 1
0 e¡½tC(t)bdt over all fea-
sible non-decreasing consumption paths.
To apply the revealed welfare analysis of Sects. 4 and 5, we must show that
Assumption 2 is satisﬁed. It follows from (27) that
¹(t) R 1
0 ¹(s)ds = ½e¡½t for t 2 [0;¿)
R 1
¿ ¹(s)ds R 1




Hence, since consumption is constant in the eventual sustainability constrained
phase, we have that W(K0
M;K0












Since (ΨM(0);ΨN(0)) is the vector of partial derivatives of
R 1
0 ¹(t)C¤(t)bdt w.r.t.

































over all attainable consumption-investment pairs.
It now follows from Prop. 2 that welfare is increasing if and only if there is growth
in real nnp, aK¤
M(t)=·¤(t). Since (12) implies that the growth rate of real nnp equals
(¯(·)¡b)=·, welfare is increasing as long as the path remains in the unconstrained
utilitarian phase, during which ¯(·) > b. Since ¯(·) reaches b at the point in time at
27which the sustainability constraint becomes binding, the observation that the growth
rate of real nnp decreases towards zero indicates that unconstrained development
is no longer sustainable. Hence, the information on welfare changes oﬀered by the
growth rate of real nnp is useful for the management of society’s assets, given that
unsustainable paths are deemed socially unacceptable. Note that consumption yields
no such indication, since the rate of consumption growth falls discontinuously to zero
at the time the path enters the sustainability constrained phase.




M(t)(1 ¡ b=¯(·¤(t))), being positive. Again
¯(·) > b during the unconstrained utilitarian phase implies that welfare is increas-
ing, while the observation that the value of net investments decreases towards zero as
¯(·) approaches b indicates that unconstrained development is no longer sustainable.
Thus, also the sign of the value of net investments is useful for asset management.
Note that the growth rate of nnp (and equivalently, the value of net investments)
indicates when the sustainability constraint becomes binding precisely because poli-
cies implementing sustainable development are expected and, hence, reﬂected in the
ratio of investment prices. It is well-known that sustainability cannot be indicated
in this manner if instead an unconstrained utilitarian path is expected to be followed
throughout (cf. Asheim, 1994; Pezzey, 1994).
7 Concluding remarks
We have established that growing real nnp—or equivalently, a positive value of net
investments—can be used to indicate welfare improvement, independently of the
welfare criterion adopted by society. As long as the policies that society implements
leads to an eﬃcient path that does not waste opportunity for welfare improvement,
the underlying—but unspeciﬁed and unobservable—welfare judgements will be re-
vealed through prices and quantities that are available in a perfect market economy.
It is a merit of such a revealed welfare approach that we need not be concerned with
what the actual social preferences are when drawing welfare conclusions on the basis
of national accounting aggregates.
We have thus shown that the result of Asheim and Weitzman (2001)—namely
that increasing measurable nnp in real Divisia prices indicates welfare improvement
in a multiple consumption good setting even when utility itself is not measurable—
can be generalized further to situations where society does not subscribe to dis-
28counted utilitarianism. Thus, the present analysis covers also circumstances where,
for example, progress and sustainability are important concerns. We have exempli-
ﬁed this in Sect. 3 by showing in general that maximin, in addition to discounted
utilitarianism, is encompassed by the present approach, and in Sect. 6 by consider-
ing two resource allocation mechanisms in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of capital
accumulation and resource depletion; one that implements undiscounted utilitarian-
ism and one that maximizes the sum of discounted utilities within the subset of
sustainable paths. In the latter case, real nnp growth approaching zero indicates
that unconstrained development is no longer sustainable.
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30Appendix: Proof of Lemma 4
For ﬁxed (K0
M;K0
N) À 0, let fC¤(t)g be the consumption path implemented by the re-
source allocation mechanism and let fC(t)g denote any feasible non-decreasing consumption







dt · 0: (29)




0 e¡½tdt = 1=½. This implies that





















By (27), there exists a time ¾ > ¿ such that





0 ¹(t)dt, e¡½t = ¹(t) for t 2 (0;¿), and C¤(t) = C¤(¾) for





















































· 0 by the deﬁnition of ¾ since fC(t)g is non-decreasing.
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